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Abstract: The paper considers models and mechanisms of
resource allocation that are interpreted in a meaningful way
either as problems of allocating costs for the implementation
of a common project (program) between participants
(investors) interested in this project, or as problems of
distributing income or profits received from joint activities of
several participants. Agents can be legal entities and
individuals, as well as federal and local governments.
Various mechanisms of distribution of costs (incomes) are
given-priority, competitive, fair play mechanisms, etc.
Keywords: project, program, resource allocation,
distribution of costs, distribution of income or profits, agents,
cost allocation mechanisms, priority function, R - absolute,
direct and reverse priorities mechanisms, competitive
mechanisms, multi-stage cost allocation mechanisms, Nash
equilibrium situation.

Introduction
The tasks of allocating costs and incomes are,
perhaps, are the most common tasks of resource
allocation in a market economy. Indeed, a
characteristic feature of modern market relations is
the integration of the efforts of market enterprises,
firms, other legal and natural persons, as well as
federal (republican) and local authorities for the
implementation of projects and programs of
common interest. How to divide the costs for the
implementation of a project or program, how to
allocate the revenue obtained as a result of their
implementation are central tasks, on the
effectiveness of solving which depends the success
in achieving the set goals. The tasks of distribution
of incomes and expenses are very close to the

known problem of distribution of a limited
resource, the methods of solving which have been
developed in great detail [1,2,3,4]. However,
unlike the latter, in this case, the costs (income) are
not limited, but depend on the total income (costs)
that the participants (hereinafter referred to as
agents) wish to receive (can spend). Nevertheless,
there is a fairly close relationship between the
mechanisms for allocating scarce resources and the
mechanisms for allocating income and costs.
The paper provides various mechanisms for
allocating costs and revenues.The cost allocation
model is taken as the base. The following scheme
of agent interaction is considered.
Each agent reports an estimate of yi , the
required resources (material or financial), the use
of which gives him a certain income φi (yi ) (in a
particular case, this estimate can be interpreted
directly as an estimate of the income that the agent
expects to receive from the implementation of the
overall program) . The costs of C(Y) on a program
common to all agents depend on the total resource
Y = ∑nj=1 yj , which agents demanded. The task is to
determine the mechanism for allocating these costs
among
agents
xi = πi (yi ),
where
̅̅̅̅̅
y = (y1 , y2 , . . . , yn ), 1, n , where n is the number of
agents, and obviously ∑i xi = C(Y).
The functioning of the system with a given
mechanism of distribution of costs (incomes) can
be considered as a game of 𝑛 persons (agents),
which strategies are the message of estimating the
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required resource (or estimating the parameters of
the revenue function), and the payoff function is
equal to the difference in income and costs.
As a solution to the game in this paper, we
consider the Nash equilibrium situation or a set of
dominant strategies (if they exist).
1. The tasks of allocating costs and incomes
in a market economy
Task 1. Financing of the joint project. Several
firms (agents) decided to jointly implement the
construction of an object of common interest.
From the operation of this facility, the firm i
expects to receive an income q i .
The cost of the construction of an object
depends on the total income that firms expect to
receive. We will denote the yi estimate of the
income reported by firm i (the representative of the
company reports to the Board of Directors of the
joint-stock company established to implement the
construction of the facility).
Then the total estimate of the expected income
yi is Y = ∑i yi
and the costs are C(Y). Obviously, C(Y). is an
increasing function of Y, C(0) = 0. How to allocate
these costs between the founding companies of the
joint-stock company? Let's designate the
mechanism of distribution of expenses
x = π(y) (xi = πi (y),

i = ̅̅̅̅̅
1, n , ∑ πi (y) = C(Y)).
i

What is the most fair and preferred cost
allocation mechanism? As a rule, for this problem
it is assumed that a fair mechanism must satisfy
two conditions (axioms): anonymity and
monotony.
The axiom of anonymity: the mechanism for
allocating costs is called anonymous if the result of
the distribution does not depend on the
renumbering of agents. In other words, the
distribution of costs depends only on estimates of
the expected income, and the non-identical agent
has no special advantage over other agents.
Axiom of monotony: with an increase in the
estimate of the expected income of the
i -th agent, its costs (∂π∂yi (y) ≥ 0) do not decrease. In
i
a stronger form, the axiom of monotonicity
132
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requires that the agent's share of costs increase (as
it does not decrease) with an increase in his
i (y)
] ≥ 0).
estimate of expected income (∂y∂ [πC(Y)
i
The axiom of anonymity reflects the natural
requirement of equality of partners, and the axiom
of monotony is just as natural a requirement, the
essence of which: the more you get, the more you
pay.
Task 2. Financing development programs. A
large company, uniting several enterprises, is
developing a development program. This program
is a combination of development programs for
individual enterprises that are members of the
association. Each enterprise forms and submits its
program to the Board of Directors (or boards) of
the firm with the justification of the required
funding yi . Denote φi (yi ) the expected income of
the i - th enterprise as a result of the program
implementation. If the total amount of funds
∑ni yi = Y,
required for financing all programs
exceeds the value of the centralized development
fund of firm R, that is, Y = ∑j yi > 𝑅 (as a rule, this
excess is significant), then it becomes necessary to
obtain additional funds by taking a loan, issuing
additional shares, etc., which leads to additional
costs Y − R). ). The difference Y − R). determines
the amount of additional costs for the
implementation of all programs. The task is to
allocate these additional costs between enterprises.
Task 3. Distribution of income. In a certain
sense this problem is dual to the previous one.
Several enterprises are merged to implement a
common project. Each enterprise reports the
amount of money yi , that it can invest in this
project (that is, the amount of costs). The expected
income from the project C(Y), of course, depends
on the amount of total financing Y, Y = ∑i yi . How to
distribute this income C(Y) between enterprises?
Here, the axioms of anonymity and monotony are
natural, although exceptions are possible (if, for
example, state or local authorities act as one of the
enterprises).
Task 4. Financing priority development
programs.
At present, stabilization and sustainable
development of the economy is possible only on
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the basis of selective state support for priority
areas. The forms of such support are different. This
includes direct budget financing (partial or full),
and concessional lending, and preferential taxation,
etc. When forming programs for the development
of priority areas, a competition for participation in
these programs is organized. Public, private
enterprises (state-private partnerships) and
organizations submit applications, indicating the
amount of required financial resources and
justifying the effectiveness of their participation in
the program. It is necessary to form a program,
defining the composition of participants, the form
of state support and the amount of funding.
As noted above, the problem of cost allocation
is closely related to the known problem of the
distribution of limited resources. Indeed, consider
the following cost dependence on the
implementation of the program C(Y) on the required
funding Y

The condition (2.1) is used automatically when
priority mechanisms are used.
Depending on the type of functions ηi (yi ) the
mechanisms of direct, inverse and absolute
priorities are distinguished. The direct mechanisms
priorities ηi (yi ) an increasing function yi , 𝑖 = ̅̅̅̅̅̅
1, n ,
mechanisms in reverse priorities ηi (yi ) - decreasing
function yi , 𝑖 = ̅̅̅̅̅̅
1, n , and in the mechanisms of
absolute priorities ηi (∙) does not depend on yi , that
is, ηi (yi ) = αi ≥ 0. Obviously, priority mechanisms
satisfy the axiom of monotony (in strong form). If
anonymity is required, then the priority functions
ηi (yi ) must be the same (should not depend on).
A wide class of cost allocation mechanisms can
be obtained by analyzing known mechanisms for
the distribution of limited resources. Recall that the
mechanism for the distribution of limited resources
is the mapping of the vector of claims {yi } to the
resource allocation vector xi = θi (y, R), such that

λY,
C(Y) = {
M,

We show that any mechanism allocation of
limited resources satisfying the axiom of monotony
of R (θi (y, R)) is an increasing function R, i = ̅̅̅̅̅
1, n),
we can associate a certain cost allocation
mechanism π(y, R). We will take first, that C(Y) is a
piecewise-linear continuous function Y with break
points R k , k = ̅̅̅̅̅
1, q , that is:

if Y ≤ R
,
if Y > R

where M is a large number, certainly exceeding
the expected total effect from the program. It is
quite obvious that the resulting estimates of the
required amount of funding will be such that
n

∑ yi ≤ R.
i

Therefore, the distribution of costs will
correspond to a certain distribution of the limited
resource R with the price of the resource λ .
2. Mechanisms for allocating costs and
revenues
The cost allocation mechanism assigns a set of
n
{yi } i=1
estimates of the agents
to the cost
n
distribution {xi = πi (y)}i=1 such that
∑i πi (y) = C(Y)

(2.1)

We describe the mechanisms of cost allocation.
First of all, due to their simplicity, priority
mechanisms are singled out. In these mechanisms,
for each agent, its priority (weight) ηi (yi ), is
determined, and costs are allocated directly in
proportion to the priorities of the agents
xi = πi (y) = ∑

ηi

i ηi (yi )

∙ C(Y).

(2.2)

∑i θi (y, R) = R.

C(Y) = C (R k−1 ) + λk (Y − R k−1 ); R k−1 < 𝑌 ≤ R k ,
λk ≥ 0,
where R 0 = 0, C(R 0 ) = 0.
Define the segment
[𝑅𝑞−1 , 𝑅𝑞 ] , such that
R q−1 < 𝑌 ≤ R q . We allocate in sequence the resource
in the number R1 , R 2 ,∙∙∙, R q−1, Y based on the
mechanism π (y, R). Denote by {xik , i = ̅̅̅̅̅
1, n , k = ̅̅̅̅̅
1, q}

the corresponding resource allocation. The
resulting cost allocation is defined as follows:
q
zi = ∑k=1 λk (xik − xik−1 ); xi0 = 0

(2.3)

Now let C(Y) be an arbitrary nondecreasing
differentiable function, πi (y, R) – differential
functions R. We remark that
∑
i

dπi (y, R)
=1
dR

Determine the costs of the
follows
Y dC(R)

zi = ∫0

dR

∙

∂πi (y,R)
∂R

∙ dR

i -

th agent as
(2.4)
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It is easy to see that ∑i zi = C(Y). Thus, any
allocation mechanism of a limited resource R
generates a well-defined cost allocation
mechanism. The corresponding mechanism for
allocating costs will be called the R - mechanism.
Let's describe the basic mechanisms of distribution
of limited resources and the mechanisms of cost
distribution
generated
by
them
(R - mechanism).
Priority mechanisms for resource allocation. In
these mechanisms, as well as in the priority
mechanisms for allocating costs (2.2), the
distribution is carried out on the basis of agent
priority functions

R - the mechanism of direct priorities. Consider
three types of priority function η(∙) - convex, linear
and concave.
a) Convex priority functions. Let ηi (yi ) = yi2 and
yi order in descending order and all are different,
that is y1 > y2 > ∙ ∙ ∙> yn .
Denote by:
n

j=1

j=1

It is easy to show that
i

zi =

yi2

∑
k=1

C(R k ) − C(R k−1 )
,
A2k

where

xi = πi (y, R)min(yi ; γ ∙ ηi (yi )) (2.5)

k

where 𝛾 is determined from equation

Ak = √∑ yj2 ,

∑ min (yi ; γ ∙ ηi (yi )) = R.

C(R 0 ) = 0,

Depending on the type of priority functions, the
mechanisms of absolute, direct and reverse priority
are singled out.
Let's consider corresponding R-mechanisms
(mechanisms of distribution of expenses),
satisfying anonymity condition:
R - the mechanism of absolute priorities.
Let ηi (yi ) = 1 (similar conclusions can be
obtained if all priority functions are equal to the
same positive quantity), then
xi = min(𝑦𝑖 ; 𝛾) , i = ̅̅̅̅̅
1, n. ,
where γ is determined from equation
∑i min (yi ; γ) = R.

Let y1 < y2 <∙ ∙ ∙ < yn . We denote by
R i = ∑i−1
j=1 yj + γi [n − (i − 1)], i = 2, n.
Note that {R i } - is an increasing sequence,
hence if R i−1 < 𝑅 < R i , , then
yj ,
1≤ j≤ i−1
γi = yi ,

j≥i

those the resource is distributed according to the
following procedure:

For comparison, we note that the usual priority
mechanism for allocating costs (2.2) with the same
priority functions gives the following distribution
of costs:
z̃i =

yi2
∙ C(Y)
A21

It can be shown that an R-mechanism with
convex priority functions gives a certain advantage
to agents with high bids. More precisely, we have:
i

i

∑ zk < ∑ z̃k ,
k=1

i = ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
1 , (n)

k=1

b) Linear priority functions. Let ηi (yi ) = √yi ,
In this case
xi = πi (y, R) = yi ∙ min(1; γ) =

i−1

γi = √yi , R i = ∑ yj + γi √Bi

where
γ=

R−∑i−1
k=1 yk
n−(i−1)

j=1

;

by:

where so

n
C(Rk )−C(Rk−1 )
n−k+1

, C(R 0 ) = 0 ,

C(R n ) = C(Y).

Bi = (∑ √yj )
j=1

134

yi R
,
Y

R≤Y.

and R - the mechanism is completely analogous
to the usual priority mechanism with linear priority
functions.
c) Concave priority functions. Let ηi (yi ) =
√yi and yi order in ascending order and all are
different, that is y1 < y2 < ∙ ∙ ∙ < yn .
Denote

xj (y, R) = min(yj ; γ ),

zi = ∑ik=1

C(R n ) = C(Y).

j=1

i

xj (y, R) = {R − ∑i−1
k=1 yk
,
n − (i − 1)

i−1

1
γi = , R i = ∑ yj + γi ∑ yj2 .
yi

2

, i = ̅̅̅̅̅
1, n .
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We have
i

z i = √ yi ∙ ∑

C(R k ) − C(R k−1 )
√Bk

k=1

A conventional priority mechanism with the
same priority functions is given by the cost
distribution
z̃i =

√ yi
√Bi

∙ C(Y),

̅̅̅̅̅
i = 1,
n .

In this case, the R-mechanism gives an
advantage to agents with smaller orders, that is,
there is
i

i

∑ zk < ∑ z̃k .
k=1

k=1

R - the mechanism of reverse priorities.
Consider the priority functions ηi (yi ) = 1⁄yi . Let yi
be ordered in ascending order and all are different,
that is, y1 < y2 < ∙ ∙ ∙ < yn .
Denote by:
k

γi = yi ,

n

R i = ∑ yj + γi
j=1

1
1
, где Q i = (∑ )
yi
Qi

zi = zi−1 +

1
[C(nyi ) − C(nyi−1 )] .
n−i+1

Obviously, in both cases:
n

∑ zi = C(Y).

Multi-stage cost allocation mechanisms.
Let С(Y) be a piecewise linear convex function
of Y with breakpoints
R k , k = ̅̅̅̅̅̅
1 ,ℓ,

that is С(Y) = C(R k−1 ) + λk (Y − R k−1 ),
Y ∈ [R k−1 , R k ], λk ≥ λk−1 .
In this case it is natural to treat λk as the price of
the resource on the segment [R k−1 , R k ]. Let's

i

1
∑[C(R k ) − C(R k−1 )] ∙ Q k ,
yi
k

C(R 0 ) = 0 , C(R n ) = C(Y) .

It is not possible to compare R - the mechanism
of reverse priorities with usual priority
mechanisms in this case, since the priority
mechanism with decreasing priority functions does
not satisfy the monotonicity condition. However, R
- the mechanism of reverse priorities gives very
serious advantages to agents with smaller
applications. Namely, such agents pay for the same
amount of resource less than agents with higher
bids. This follows from relation
πi (y , R) < πj (y, R) ,

̅̅̅̅̅
i = 1,
n .

(in the case of identical applications, costs are
also taken equal).
In the second mechanism:

i=1

,

We have
zi =

zi = C(Yi ) − C(Yi−1 ), Y0 = 0 ,

−1

k=1

̅̅̅̅̅
i = 2,
n .

only on his application and on applications of
agents with a higher priority.
We confine with a description of the R mechanism on the basis of competition, on the
condition of anonymity. In this case, the agents are
ordered in ascending order. Let y1 < y2 < ∙ ∙ ∙ <
yn . We denote by Yi = ∑ij=1 yi .
In the literature, two mechanisms of cost
allocation are considered based on the competition
[1, 4]. In the first, the costs of the agent are
determined by the expression:

for all i > 𝑗 ,

𝑅 < Rj .

Competitive mechanisms of resource allocation.
These mechanisms constitute a special class of
priority mechanisms [1,2,3,4]. Agents are ranked
by priority. The agent with the highest priority is in
a sense a dictator. He gets the resource first. The
remaining agents get the resource in descending
order of priorities. The distribution of costs can be
done in various ways. However, the following
condition must be met: agent costs may depend

consider mechanisms of distribution of expenses in
which basis the stage-by-stage procedure of
resource allocation lays. At the first stage, the
resource is distributed in the quantity Δ1 = R1 at the
price λ1 , on the second - the resource in the
quantity Δ2 = R 2 − R1 at the price λ2 , etc., until at
the next stage there are people wishing to receive
the resource. At each stage, agents submit an
application Sik on the resource they want to receive
at this stage. Possible the different organization of
multi-stage procedures. You can do several
iterations at each stage, approaching the
equilibrium situation at this stage. It is possible, on
the contrary, at each stage to allow only one
iteration (one message of applications), repeating
the procedure after the orders at the next stage are
zero.
Multistage mechanisms are attractive because
they allow to apply the distribution procedures for
a limited resource for cost allocation. Note that due
135
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to the increase in the resource price with the
growth of the stage number, it is preferable for
agents to receive a resource at an early stage. This
fact further brings together a multi-stage procedure
for allocating costs with procedures for allocating a
limited resource. Indeed, we denote υik ikoptimal
number of resources for the i − th agent at the
price λk . Obviously, the goal of the i − th agent at
some stage is to get the resource in the amount of
υik (then at the subsequent stages the resource is
no longer needed). Thus, gaming analysis of multistage procedures, in fact, breaks down into a
phased analysis of the procedures for allocating a
limited resource.
Two-prong mechanisms with the message of an
estimation of effect or efficiency of distribution of
expenses.
In cases where the authority allocating the
resource (hereinafter referred to as its center) is
able to obtain information on the actual effect of
agents φi (yi ) on the use of the resource yi , the cost
allocation can be carried out on the basis of two
estimates - the required resource yi and the
expected efficiency of its use ξi , where efficiency is
understood as the ratio of the effect φi (yi ) to the
resource yi . The fact that the center has information
on the actual effect allows it to apply a system of
sanctions (penalties and bonuses) in the case when
the expected (or promised by the agent) effect ξi ∙ yi
does not coincide with the actual one [2,3,4]. So, in
the case of linear sanctions, the agent's objective
function takes the form
fi (yi , ξi ) = φi (yi ) − α(ξi yi − φi (yi ))

where α
is the coefficient of penalty
(premiums).
Often, sanctions are applied only in the form of
fines in the case when the actual effect is lower
than
expected.
In
this
case
fi = {

φi (yi ) − zi , if ξi yi ≤ φi (yi )
φi (yi ) − α(ξi yi − φi (yi )) − zi , if ξi yi > φi (yi ).

If 𝛼 is so large that the excess of the expected
effect over the actual is clearly unprofitable to the
agent, we get a case of "heavy fines". Typically,
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cost allocation mechanisms that use performance
ratings are arranged in such a way that the agent is
interested in overestimating the estimate. With
heavy penalties, such data manipulation is
disadvantageous for agents and therefore the
reported estimate is equal to ξi = φiy(yi) [1,2].
i
All the above mechanisms of cost allocation can
be applied in the case of two estimates. To do this,
it is sufficient to make the priority function ηi (ξi )
dependent on the efficiency estimate ξi (naturally,
ηi (ξi ) increasing functions ξi ). For two-pronged
mechanisms, the condition of anonymity seems
natural and fair, as the effectiveness estimates fully
reflect the differences between agents.
Conclusion
The models and mechanisms for allocating
costs and incomes cover a broad class of applied
problems related to the choice of financing
schemes for investment projects, the distribution of
income in corporate structures, the implementation
of large social programs affecting federal and
regional interests, etc. Many tasks in the work are
only delivered and require additional research.
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